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Bolding v. Holshauser: What Remedy for Violation of Prisoner's Eighth
Amendment Rights?
In Holshauser v. Bolding, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
allegations of "severe over crowding, inadequate administration of hearing
procedures, improper classification of inmates, inadequate and restricted pro-
grams for education, recreation, and work release, improper treatment of
prisoners in solitary, and improper interference with the transmittal of
prisoner mail" 2 were sufficient to state a cause of action.3
Bolding and twenty-eight other inmates of thirteen North Carolina prisons
filed a class action suit in the Western District of North Carolina against the
entire North Carolina prison system alleging a violation of their constitutional
rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, as well as article I, Section 27 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution.4 The inmates sought injunctions against new prisoners
entering the North Carolina prison system until minimum constitutional
standards were fixed and met; injuncti6ns to reduce prison populations through
release or parole; enjoinment of further prison construction until constitu-
tionally acceptable minimum guidelines were developed and met; provision of
basic sanitary, hygenic, and medical facilities; development and implementation
of inmate protection plans; enjoinment of unjustified mail censorship; and pro-
tection of due process rights in administrative hearings. 5
The District Court commented that the relief sought by the inmates was of a
sweeping, reformatory nature. The court considered that it had been asked "to
I. Bolding v. Holshauser, 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1978) (order reversing dismissal), cert. denied,
99 S.Ct. 121 (1978).
2. Bolding v. Holshauser, (No. A-C-76-74 W.D. N.C. Mem. and Order dismissing Aug. 4,
1976).
3. In discussing the sufficiency of the allegations, the Fourth Circuit noted that the underlying
policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to liberalize procedure and that under Rule 8,
plaintiffs only need to make a short, plain statement of a claim showing that they are entitled to
relief and further that detailed factual averments are no longer necessary in order to avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b) (6). The test of sufficiency that the court used to establish compliance with Rule 8
when a section 12(b) (6) motion has been filed was the test in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957):
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.
The Fourth Circuit found that four of the five basic allegations made by plaintiffs survived this
test and on the fifth, with regard to procedural due process, plaintiffs must be granted leave to
amend. The court noted that similar allegations had been deemed a sufficient basis for a claim in
other prisoners' rights suits. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Sweet v. S.C. Dept. of
Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), and
Newman v. Ala., 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). If necessary, the
District court might delineate issues and sever and/or transfer claims.
A lengthy dissent would, however, follow the District Court decision and allow only individual
actions based on individual claims.
4. Bolding v. Holshauser, No. A-C-76-74 (W.D. N.C. Mem. and Order dismissing Aug. 4,
1976). The District Court had dismissed, finding that Plaintiffs merely asserted legal conclusions
without supporting factual allegations.
5. Id. 1
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usurp the power of the North Carolina Department of Correction and to take
under its control and management the prison system of this sovereign State."
'6
The District Court, relying on Rizzo v. Goode,7 said it had "no authority to fol-
low such a course of conduct and would refuse to do so under [the]circumstances
if the power did exist."' 8 "[P]rinciples of equity, comity, and federalism" called
for 'Judicial restraint by the federal courts into matters concerning the internal
affairs of a governmental agency."9 The District Court would have allowed
redress for the alleged wrongs, if proven, only upon a pleading of individual facts
by each respective plaintiff.
The Fourth Circuit felt compelled to remind the District Court "of the scope
of a proper exercise of its jurisdiction in an appropriate case."' 0 The court
noted that while Rizzo v. Goode' cautioned against sweeping injunctions
directed at state executive officials, it did "not preclude recourse to broad
injunctions when a clear pattern of unconstitutional conduct has been
established."' 2 Rizzo did not overrule Procunier v. Martinez, 3 where the
Court, after stating that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration and reform,"' 4 nevertheless added:
But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to
take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a
federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice
offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights. Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969). 4i6 U.S. at 405-06.15
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the holding in Newman v. Alabama,'6 and
said: "notwithstanding Rizzo, class relief requiring sweeping changes in a
state prison system may still be mandated when the proof requires such relief."' 7
The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal 8 and remanded for proceedings
6. Id. at 4.
7. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
8. See notes 2 and 4 supra, at 4.
9. Id.
10. See note I supra, at 466.
Ii. See note 7 supra.
12. See note I supra, at 466.
13. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
14. Id. at 405.
15. See note I supra, at 466.
16. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
17. See note I supra, at 466.
18. When urged by defendants that venue was lacking since all but one of the defendants resided
outside of the Western District of North Carolina (28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) nondiversity cases "may be
brought only in the judicial district, where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except
as otherwise provided by law,") the court noted that a special provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1393 (a)
is applicable here: a civil action -not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different dis-
tricts in the same state, may be brought in any of such districts."
2
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consistent with its opinion. After circulation of the opinion and dissent, 9 a
suggestion for an en bane hearing failed for lack of a majority.20
On October 2, 1978, the Supreme Court denied review on a petition for
certiorari by defendants.
21
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment exists not only in the
Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution, but also in virtually all the
state constitutions. However, the United States Supreme Court has rarely
attempted to review or define cruel and unusual punishment. The constitu-
tionality of the death penalty was not considered until 1972 in Furman v.
Georgia2 2 although the Court had previously considered the means to be used in
executing a sentence of death. 23 While the relative harshness of a sentence has oc-
casionally been challenged, 24 the Court has infrequently found individual
sentences cruel and unusual punishment, 25 although it did reverse a particularly
harsh sentence in Weems v. United States.
26
Cruel and unusual punishment has been imprecisely defined and a variety of
tests have been applied to various factual patterns. A primary test is
whether under all circumstances the punishment in question is "of such
character or consequences as to shock general conscience or be intolerable in
fundamental fairness. '27 Underlying the Eighth Amendment prohibition is the
basic concept of "the dignity of man." "The Amendment must draw its mean-
19. In his dissent, Judge Bryan finds any entertainment of this complaint a "bald, bold and
entire usurpation of an official state function." He also feels that the complaint has an "integral and
facial insufficiency in law." See note I supra, at 468. The dissent further states that "[a] more sweep-
ing obtrusion upon the sovereignty of a State is not readily even to be conjectured." See note I supra,
at 469. Judge Bryan takes severe exception to the all encompassing nature of the allegations and
relief prayed for and notes that he follows a prior Fourth Circuit case which severely curtails federal
court invasion of a state's operation of its correctional system.
The dissent also finds it onerous that each of the 29 purported class representatives is not
simultaneously present in all of the 77 North Carolina prisons. Since the 29 prisoners bringing
this action are incarcerated in only 13 of these prisons, and these units are "separated by miles and
each is in a different county," Judge Bryan questions "how ... can they be heard to speak for condi-
tions throughout the State or even in another unit?' The dissent contends that this case "fails on its
facts [and] it fails on its face," the "infirmity is not of form but in substance." 575 F.2d at 470.
Judge Bryan would leave plaintiffs free to bring separate actions for themselves and others similarly
deprived in the same prison.
20. From addendum comments one justice not entitled to vote re en bane hearing agrees with the
dissent and three of the eight justices entitled to vote re en bane hearing dissent from the failure to
rehear en bane for reasons stated in the dissent. Apparently the vote for en bane was 4-4 with one
judge not entitled to vote.
21. See note I supra.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (death by firing squad upheld).
24. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Supreme Court held here that the loss of nationality
due to conviction of desertion during wartime was cruel and unusual punishment.
25. See, e.g., Badders v. U.S., 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
26. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). A 12-20 year sentence at hard labor with ankle and wrist chains, and loss
of civil rights was found to be excessive for the crime of accessory in falsification of a public docu-
ment.
27. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965).
3
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ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," 28 The Court, in Weems v. United States, 29 held that I) a punishment
may be considered cruel and unusual if it is greatly disproportionate to the of-
fense for which it has been imposed, and 2) a punishment may be cruel and un-
usual when, although it is applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, the pun-
ishment goes far beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim; that is, when a
punishment is unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose for which it is used.
Many conditions of prison life violate these imprecise tests-particularly in
view of "our evolving standards of decency." 30 The court in Wright v.
McMann3' held that conditions have to be "shocking", "barbarous," "disgust-
ing," or "debasing" before a violation of the Eighth Amendment is found.
All force has not been condemned. The courts have been reluctant to find
violations of the Eighth Amendment where the force was used to quell dis-
turbances such as riots, even where the force was excessive. "The amount of
force used cannot be measured by a micrometer, nor can it be considered
separate and apart from the circumstance [at hand] .... -32
In Holt v. Sarver,33 the court was also reluctant to impose liability on prison
officials for failure to protect inmates from assault (physical and sexual) by other
inmates. While, theoretically, there may be a constitutional right to some degree
of protection from attacks by fellow inmates, that right is rarely upheld in
individual cases.
Penn v. Oliver34 gave both a rationale for the failure to uphold the freedom
from bodily harm in all cases, and a formula to be used in determining when
those rights will be upheld.
It would be fantasy to believe that even the most enlightened prison
officials operating with unlimited resources could prevent all acts
of violence within the prison. Moreover, even if a prison official fails
through his negligence to prevent an act of violence, a violation of
constitutional right is not of necessity stated. To the contrary, there must
be a showing either of a pattern of undisputed and unchecked violence
or, on a different level, of an egregious failure to provide security to a
particular inmate, before a deprivation of constitutional right is
stated. 3
5
Originally, the courts held that a prisoner had the status of "a slave of the
state" and therefore had no rights. 36 Almost sixty years later in Siegel v. Ragen,
37
28. 356 U.S. at 101.
29. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). Subhuman conditions in a strip cell violated civilized standards
of human decency where the prisoner was naked, exposed to winter cold and deprived of the basic
elements of hygiene, soap and toilet paper.
32. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 858, 372 P.2d 304, 310 (1962).
33. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
34. 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972).
35. Id. at 1294.
36. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
37. 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. 111. 1949).
4
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the court said:
This court is prepared to protect state prisoners from death or serious
bodily harm in the hands of prison authorities, but it is not prepared
to establish itself as a "co-administrator" of State prisons along with
the duly appointed State officials. All the remaining matters alleged in
the amended complaint are strictly matters of internal administration
and discipline, and it is not the function of a Federal Court to assume
the status of an appellate tribunal for the purpose of reviewing each
and every act and decision of a State official.
3 8
Five years earlier, however, in Coffin v. Reichard,39 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals had held that "a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." By
recognizing that a retraction of those rights is justified by certain underlying
considerations, Price v. Johnson4 allowed, indeed promoted, the interpre-
tation that constitutional rights invariably had to give way to expressed (but
rarely documented) corrections problems in administering a prison system.
It was not until the late 1960's and early 1970's that courts began serious
reviews of prisoners' claims and intervention on their behalf. The federal
district courts (under the Federal Civil Rights Act-42 U.S.C. § 1983) began
to consistently find violations of prisoners' rights under the First,41 Eighth, 42 and
Fourteenth43 Amendments.
In Sostre v. Rockefeller," the District Court held that 1) placing a prisoner in
punitive segregation without certain procedural safeguards (notice, impartial
hearing examiner, right of cross-examination, right to present witnesses, right to
counsel/counsel substitute, written decision with reasons for finding and dis-
position) violated due process; and 2) holding a prisoner in punitive segregation
for over one year constituted cruel and unusual punishment. To ensure ap-
propriate correctional measures, the court retained jurisdiction over the
corrections officials until they complied with its orders. Other cases had
similar holdings45 and in each case the federal court determined 1) that certain
constitutional rights were fundamental to prisoners; 2) that existing practices
and procedures or facilities and resources abridged those rights; 3) that cor-
rections officials did not make an adequate showing that valid correctional con-
38. Id. at 999.
39. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944) A later court however, did recognize that "lawful incarcera-
tion brings about a necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retrac-
tion justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266
(1948).
40. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
41. First Amendment-access to courts, freedom of expression and freedom of religion.
42. Eighth Amendment-freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
43. Fourteenth Amendment-due process in disciplinary and other institutional matters.
44. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971).
45. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (cruel and unusual punishment); Pal-
migiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D. R.I. 1970) (censorship of mail); Cluchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (disciplinary due process). 5
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cerns justified such abridgements; and 4) that changes had to be made in
accordance with the mandate of the court's opinion.
This bold new intervention, however, was sharply curtailed in the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' review of Sostre v. Rockefeller.46 In Sostre v.
McGinnis,47 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected the District
Court's approach on the cruel and unusual punishment and the procedural due
process issues. "For a federal court.., to place a punishment beyond the power
of a state ... is a drastic interference with the state's free political and adminis-
trative processes. '48 The Second Circuit reversed the District Court formulation
for procedural due process. Although the court did hold that minimum protec-
tions were necessary, "[they] would not presume to fashion a constitutional
harness of nothing more than [their] guesses.... This is ajudgment entrusted to
state officials, not federal judges."
49
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 50 the Court adopted an extremely narrow view of the
procedural safeguards which were constitutionally required for a disciplinary
hearing (no less than twenty four hour advance notice, right to receive a written
statement of the evidence and reasons for the decision, and right to call wit-
nesses, if institutional safety or correctional goals are not jeopardized). The
Court stated that adversary proceedings typical of a criminal trial might increase
staff/ inmate confrontation and make the use of the disciplinary process ineffec-
tive in advancing the rehabilitative goals of the penal institution.
In the landmark cases, Holt v.Sarver,5 1 the issue was whether the conditions
of certain penal institutions, as a whole, were so shocking they constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The court found that the Arkansas prison system
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of its prisoners. The court found 1) the
prison was, for the most part, run by inmate trusty guards who bred hatred
and mistrust; 2) open barracks within the prison invited widespread physical
and sexual assaults; 3) the isolation cells were overcrowded, filthy and unsani-
tary; and 4) there was a total absence of any program of rehabilitation and
training. The court held that these conditions, as a whole, amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment and that the state may not delegate the control of a prisoner
to other convicts and "do nothing meaningful for his safety, well being, and
possible rehabilitation .... However constitutionally tolerable the Arkansas
system may have been in former years, it simply will not do today .... ,52
Elimination of unconstitutional conditions does not depend on what legisla-
tures or governors may do or even what prison administrations may be able
to accomplish. "If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is
46. See note 44 supra.
47. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
48. Id. at 191.
49. Id.
50. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
51. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971);
Holt v. Sarver. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
52. Id. at 381.
6
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going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the
United States."
53
The conditions in some prisons have been found to be so disgusting that they
violate the Eighth Amendment, 54 while in other prisons the conditions have only
been found unpleasant, but not unconstitutional.
55
Since Holt v. Sarver56 (hereinafter referred to as Holt 1) in 1969, a prisoner's
rights case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights by persons in charge of the prisons, there have been similar
cases requesting broad relief from the federal courts. In Holt I the court found
sufficient evidence to establish that the state which operated the prison where
inmates slept on cots in open barracks with no guard in the actual area failed to
discharge its constitutional duty to protect inmates. The court held that con-
finement in isolation cells which were overcrowded, dirty, unsanitary and
pervaded by bad odors from toilets constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The court noted that it was not concerned in general with prison policies,
administration or discipline. However, if the state, acting through its penal
authorities, is depriving convicts of rights which the constitution protects,
including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the court
may and should intervene to protect those rights and to put an end to uncon-
stitutional practices.57 The government owes that duty to federal prisoners, 58
and the court thought that a state prisoner was entitled to the same measure
of care from the state.
While recognizing the difficulty and delicacy involved in devising a remedy for
the conditions it finds in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, the court required that improvements be made
at the two units involved here, despite financial handicaps. The court ordered
respondents to suggest a plan to correct conditions and retained jurisdiction in
order to oversee the development of that plan.
In Holt v. Sarver (hereinafter referred to as Holt. 11),59 the District Court
found that there were conditions and practices that constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The court recognized that not all reforms could be accomplished overnight;
however, it required that improvements be made in months, not years. The
changes required would not depend on the legislature, the governor, or
even what the respondents might actually be able to accomplish, but rather
53. Id. at 385.
54. See, Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
55. State ex rel Pingley v. Coiner, 155 W. Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 220 (1972); Lake v. Lee, 329 F.
Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
56. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
57. Id. at 827.
58. Johnson v. U.S., 258 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1966), and Cohen v. U.S. 252 F. Supp. 679
(N.D. Ga. 1966).
59. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
7
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"[i]f Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be
a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United States." 60
In 1971 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Holt 1,61 but stated
that the District Court was to retain jurisdiction no longer "than necessary to
provide reasonable assurance that incarceration therein will not constitute
cruel and inhuman punishment..."62 and required an up-to-date report on pro-
gress in eliminating constitutional violations.
In January of 1973, the District Court found that it was no longer necessary to
retain jurisiction, and seven suits were brought appealing that decision.
Those suits were consolidated into Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections.63
The Eighth Circuit in Finney found that the Arkansas system still violated
constitutional rights and directed certain corrective action regarding, inter alia,
housing, racial discrimination, physical abuse, and rehabilitation programs.
Other major cases in this area are Fifth Circuit cases: Gates v. Collier,
64
Mississippi, and three Alabama cases, Pugh v. Locke6 5 and companion cases
James v. Wallace and Newman v. Alabama.66 The three Alabama cases were
consolidated on an appeal to the Fifth Circuit in 1977.67 In all of these cases, the
respective courts found violations of prisoners Eighth Amendment rights and
granted injunctions requiring broad reform in prison administration policies.
The Fifth Circuit, in Newman 68 considered the effect of Rizzo v. Goode
69
on prisoner's rights cases. Rizzo was cited by the district court in Bolding v.
Holshauser70 for the proposition that the court had no authority to usurp
the power of the North Carolina Department of Correction and to take over the
control and management of the North Carolina Prison System as the court
thought it was being requested to do. The District Court in Bolding, relying
on Rizzo, commented that "only in a limited fashion and only upon the most
extreme circumstances"'71 was the extraordinary remedy of an injunction to be
used on a state agency.
72
The Fourth Circuit in its majority opinion in Bolding simply states that
"[w]hile Rizzo states that the principles of federalism militate against injunctive
relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the executive branch of state or local
60. See notes 51 and 53 supra.
61. See note 51 supra.
62. Id. at 309.
63. 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
64. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972);'see alsoGatesv. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368(N.D. Miss.
1973), (re attorney's fees award), vacated, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
66. 522 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1975).
67. Newman v. Ala. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), modifying, 406 F. Supp. 318(M.D. Ala. 1976,
cert. denied. 98 S.Ct. 3144 (1978).
68. Id.
69. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
70. See notes 2 and 4 supra.
71. Id. at 5.
72. The Fourth Circuit dissent in Bolding also relied on Rizzo.
8
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governments, Rizzo does not preclude recourse to broad injunctions when a
clear pattern of unconstitutional conduct has been established.'"13 The court
specifically agreed with the holding in Newman v. Alabama "that, notwithstand-
ing Rizzo, class relief requiring sweeping changes in a state prison system may
still be mandated when the proof requires such relief."7 4
The Newman court, in discussing Rizzo, found that Rizzo did not mean
that constitutional standards were not to be scrupulously observed or
that the statutes designed to enforce that objective are to be denied
full effect. It [did] mean in the prison context that federal courts should
keep their eyes on the main objective, the Eighth Amendment command
for the eradication of cruel and unusual punishment. The remedy
must be designed to accomplish that goal, not to exercise judicial
power for the attainment of what we as individuals might like to see
accomplished in the way of ideal prison conditions.... The Amendment
... recognizes the right to punish for criminal conduct as long as that
punishment does not escalate to the cruel and unusual. 75
Rizzo v. Goode76 was a civil rights action against Philadelphia, its Mayor,
and other city and police officials which asked for sweeping equitable relief, in-
cluding a receiver to supervise the police department and a civilian com-
mittee to review police activity. The District Court granted limited relief
and attorney's fees 77 and the Third Circuit affirmed as to the injunctive relief.78
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioner's claims that the
judgment of the District Court was an unwarranted intrusion by the federal
judiciary into the discretionary authority of state and local law officials to per-
form their official functions. The Supreme Court was substantially in agreement
with petitioner's claims and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals judgment.
In Rizzo, the District Court found that the evidence had not established any
policy on the part of named parties to violate the constitutional rights of
plaintiffs. All that the court found was a tendency of the departmental procedure
to discourage the filing of citizens complaints and to minimize consequences
of police misconduct, and the court emphasized that respondents "had no con-
stitutional right to improve police procedures for handling civilian com-
plaints." 79 Individuals found to have violated the constitutional rights of par-
ticular persons were not named as parties to the action. There was no affirma-
tive link between the incidents and any plan or policy by petitioners-express or
otherwise.
Clearly the only way to find Rizzo applicable or inapplicable in the present
case is on the particular facts of Bolding. Until there is a finding of fact by a
73. See note I supra, at 466.
74. Id.
75. See note 67 supra, at 287.
76. See note 7 supra.
77. 357 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
78. 506 F.2d 542 (3rd Cir. 1974).
79. See note 7 supra, at 370.
9
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trial court this will be impossible. The Supreme Court in Rizzo further doubted
that there was even a case or controversy as required by article Ill of the United
States Constitution between the individually named respondents and peti-
tioners. It appeared that the requisite "personal stake in the outcome was lack-
ing."8 0 i.e., the order overhauling the police disciplinary procedures.
The Court held further that there must be a pervasive pattern of intimidation,
not just some problem typical to administrative procedures found to have some
statistical significance. The Court primarily discusses federalism principles
in the context of criminal proceedings and concludes that "the same principles
of federalism may prevent the injunction by a federal court of a state civil pro-
ceeding once begun."
8'
It is unclear how this conclusion relates to police disciplinary proceedings that
may or may not be undertaken sometime, but it is even less clear how the Dis-
trict Court in Bolding and the Fourth Circuit's dissent interpret this to have
anything to do with administratively condoned substandard conditions in a
state prison, unless they consider all of the events after final sentencing in a
criminal proceeding to be part of the "Criminal proceeding-including what a
prisoner eats, where he uses the toilet, etc." 82
In February, 1977, the Final Report of the North Carolina Legislative Com-
mission on Correctional Programs (hereinafter referred to as CCP) examined
the needs of correctional facilities in North Carolina; studied rehabilitative
programs in North Carolina; and attempted to develop a comprehensive long-
range policy recommendation for a coordinated policy on correctional pro-
grams. Among others, CCP made findings and/or recommendations in the
following areas:
1. Cleanliness and Management-
The Commission recommended that the Secretary of Correction require
inmates to assume responsibility for maintaining the sanitary standards of their
units, and for their own personal hygiene, and that the General Assembly
appropriate such additional funds as may be necessary for these purposes.82
2. Recreational Facilities-
The Commission recommended daily job assignments, upgrading recrea-
tional facilities, improved hygiene, and strong leadership to encourage maxi-
mum participation by inmates in daily activity.
83
3. Mental Health Services for Inmates-
The Commission recommended that 1) the current provision in N.C.G.S.
§ 148-22 (b) which prohibits the Secretary of Correction from contracting for
services with the provision of Mental Health Services, Department of Human
Resources, be repealed; 2) that the Commission for Mental Health Services
80. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8 1. See note 7 supra, at 380.
82. FINAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL
PROGRAMS 50 (1977).
83. Id. at 50
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establish standards for the provision of mental health services to inmates in the
custody of the Department of Correction, and that the responsibility for
implementing these standards be vested with the Secretary of Correction.
84
4. Prison Facilities-Overcrowding-
The Commission found that North Carolina's prisons are now critically over-
crowded, that inmate unrest is increasing and that unless immediate action
is taken it is likely that the federal courts will intervene in the operations of
North Carolina's prisons.85 The Commission also recommended the con-
struction of new units consisting of single cells 86 in order to control inmate
violence. The Commission made short-run suggestions to use modular con-
struction and additions to existing facilities in order to achieve an immediate
reduction of present severe overcrowding.
87
In an August 1, 1976, survey of capacity and inmate population in the south-
eastern states, 88 North Carolina's prison population exceeded its prison
capacity by 29.4 percent, the highest overcapacity of any of the southeastern
states. CCP included in their report a chart on Inmates Housing in the North
Carolina Correctional System which gave a unit breakdown of net square foot-
age for housing, inmate capacity, actual capacity (12/31/76), original design
capacity for housing in square feet per inmate, and actual square footage for
housing inmates. Only six units in the North Carolina prison system in their
current design capacity met the minimum of sixty square feet for housing re-
quired in Pugh v. Locke,8 9 and one other unit comes close. The average design
capacity square footage throughout the North Carolina system was thirty-
seven square feet; actual square footage was only thirty-one square feet, and this
was achieved only after an accelerated Christmas release program. 90
The CCP took note of the eight states, as of March 1, 1976, operating under
orders affecting the administration of their correctional programs. 91 The
Commission was realistically concerned that the federal government might
intervene in the operation of North Carolina's prison system unless immediate
efforts were made to improve conditions, particularly overcrowding.
84. Id. at 54 and Appendix H
85. Id. at 54, 56, and Appendix I.
86. Id. at 60-62.
87. Id. at 62.
88. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
89. See note 65 supra.
90. See note 82 supra, at 57.
91. (I) Alabama-law libraries, due process, medical care, isolation cells, overcrowding and
understaffing.
(2) Arkansas-basic conditions in each operational area.
(3) Kentucky-mail censorship.
(4) Mississippi-inadequate housing and staffing.
(5) Oklahoma-racial segregation, discrimination, and conditions of confinement.
(6) Texas-treatment conditions for certain plaintiffs while their cases are pending in courts.
(7) Louisiana-conditions of confinement.
(8) Florida under appeal to Fifth Circuit for overcrowding, medical treatment Id. at 54-65.
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The CCP prepared a comparison of North Carolina prison conditions with
the standards set forth in Pugh v. Locke, as the most rigorous standards yet
issued by a federal court,92 which indicated a staggering cost if the federal
courts controlled. The Commission likened the prison problem to the mental
health system situation five years earlier in North Carolina where only immedi-
ate and drastic legislative and executive intervention" produced sufficient funds
and programs to avoid a federal takeover.
The allegations in Bolding, if proven, might be remedied in the following
ways:
Mail
It has generally been held that control of inmate mail is an administrative
matter in which the courts will not interfere, unless it is shown that some in-
dependent constitutional right is being infringed by that control.93 The reason
most often advanced for this holding is that courts will not become involved in
the normal management of a prison system. Where the court has interfered with
prison mail rules, another constitutional right was involved. 94 However, today
a new approach to the general right to control an inmate's use of the mail system
seems to be evolving. Administrators' refusal to mail correspondence which does
not contain contraband or details of illegal schemes is attracting judicial
criticism in several courts.95 The transmittal of very few letters can be refused
by prison officials under the apparently emerging standard that only a threat
to the security of the institution will justify interference with inmate mail. 96
Solitary Confinement
The assertion that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional has been
rejected by the federal courts.97 However, the conditions of solitary can be
92. See note 82 supra, at Appendix 1.
93. E.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th
Cir. 1954); Medlock v. Burke, 285 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
94. E.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) In this case a prison official refused to mail
prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus; Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 197 1)
A federal court struck down a state prison regulation which permitted officials to refuse to
mail legal matter for inmates if the prison superintendent felt the language "improper"; Coleman
v. Peyton, 362 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966) This court flatly prohibited prison official censorship of
material sent to and received from a court by an inmate; cf Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776 (D.R.I. 1970) Prison officials were enjoined from opening or inspecting correspondence
between inmates awaiting trial in federal or Rhode Island courts; but see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 578 (1972) The Second Circuit expressly allowed
New York officials to read communications where "it can be demonstrated that a prisoner has
clearly abused his rights of access." Id. at 200.
95. See Caruthers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) A federal district court judge
here castigated prison officials for refusing to mail a letter from the inmate-plaintiff to his
parents. The letter contained derogatory remarks about prison conditions. The record disclosed no
"plausible basis for defendant's action." Id. at 1024.
96. Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
97. E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972);
Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Krist v. Smith, 309 F.Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970),
affd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
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disproportionate to the offense involved or used for an improper purpose, and
therefore violate the Eighth Amendment.98 Further, the procedure used to
enforce the isolation may violate "due process of law."
Legal Service
Johnson v. Avery99 was a bold departure from the traditional view that
state authorities had no obligation under the Constitution to provide legal
facilities for inmates. 100 Prison officials must allow the jail house lawyer' 0' /
inmate writ writer to practice or provide a reasonable alternative, e.g.,
implementation of an effective legal services program. 102 The Supreme Court
has assured inmates a supply of adequate legal material so that they might
have access to courts. 0 3
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
Some courts have taken the position that due process in prison disciplinary
hearings requires the same safeguards as those imposed on administrative
agencies. 104 Generally, the emerging requirements of procedural due process in
disciplinary proceedings are: 1) reasonable notice of the nature of the com-
plaint, 10 5 2) a fair hearing before an impartial official or panel, 0 6 3) adminis-
trative review of the decision, 107 4) confrontation of witnesses, 08 and 5)
right to counsel or counsel substitutes.109
It is clear that prison disciplinary proceedings must accord inmates a pro-
cedurally fair hearing. Reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before
an impartial tribunal would seem basic in order to avoid the violation of an in-
mate's constitutional rights to procedural due process.
98. E.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519(5th Cir. 1967); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F.Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Lake v. Lee, 329 Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
99. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
100. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
101. An inmate who, through self education, has acquired minimum legal skills and notwith-
standing prison restriction, offers legal advice and counselling to fellow inmates, with or without
compensation.
102. See note 99 supra.
103. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub nom., Younger v. Gil-
more, 404 U.S. 15, (1971).
104. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) The issue presented by this case was the pro-
cedure for terminating welfare benefits; see also Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971) and Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D.Cal. 1971) (prisoner's rights cases).
105. Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchettev. Procunier, 328 F.Supp.
767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
106. Braxton v. Carlson, 340 F.Supp. 999 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Kristsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.Supp.
1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
107. See Beishir v. Swenson, 331 F.Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310
F.Supp. 857 (D. R.I. 1970) The right to review was not interpreted as a constitutional due process
requirement in prison disciplinary proceedings, but rather an appellate procedure was encouraged
by the court.
108. Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) In this case it was held that there
must be a resolution of questions of fact.
109. Id.
13
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Rehabilitation
While in Holt v. Sarver' 10 a federal district court stated that in the examina-
tion of the totality of conditions within a penal institution a federal court should
consider the lack of a meaningful rehabilitation program as a factor "in the
overall constitutional equation before the court,""' generally, there is no
constitutional right to rehabilitation." 
2
Right to Medical Treatment
Generally, the federal courts have not been sympathetic to general inmate
complaints regarding medical treatment unless violation of a federally
protected right was alleged. The right to due process of law under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment is such a right and includes the inmate's right to pro-
tection from unconstitutional administrative action; 13 protection of an inmate's
life and health from administrative action;' 14 and lack of administrative review
of claims concerning denial of medical attention. 115 There is also a right to be free
from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment. This Eighth Amendment right has been found to be violated when
there is an intentional denial of needed medical care, or when a prison official's
conduct is such as to indicate a deliberate indifference to medical needs of
inmates.' 16
If a federally protected right to medical treatment is evolving, the exact nature
of that right, and the proper remedy for its enforcement are not clear.
Remedies effectively available to prisoners are the federal habeas corpus,
which requires the exhaustion of other available remedies, and the Federal
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), which is simpler and easier to use and
potentially covers a multitude of prison conditions and procedures, and offers a
wide range of possible remedies." 17 Most states have inadequate remedies and,
110. 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
I1l. id. at 379.
112. See Wilson v. Kelly, 294 F.Supp. 1005 (N. D. Ga. 1968), aJJ'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 266(1969).
However, one court has ordered specific rehabilitation programs, see Jones v. Wittenberg, 323
F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See also 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (This court required the
establishment of work or study release programs, inmate counselling programs, and educational
programs). See also Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F.Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972) This court stated that
"rehabilitation must be the overriding goal of our correctional institutions." See also James v.
Wallace, 382 F.Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
113. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
114. Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965); McCollum v. May-
field, 130 F.Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
115. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
116. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970).
117. Although the Supreme Court has held that any time a prisoner "is challenging the very fact
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is en-
titled to immediate or more speedy release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 ( 1973)". Since federal habeas corpus is only
available after the state judicial remedies have been exhausted, the case was held to be improperly
before the federal courts.
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where remedies are available, the state courts are generally less receptive to
prisoners' suits than are the federal courts. Prisoners have found support in
attacking prison conditions in some state courts,' 8 however. The lack of suc-
cess in bringing damage actions in state courts is due to 1) the doctrine of
sovereign immunity; 2) the doctrine of executive immunity for discretionary
acts; and 3) the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the potential range of remedies is virtually all-
encompassing; an injured party may recover "in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."' 19 During the past decade, several major
forms of relief have been ordered by the courts:
I. Administrattive policy reform or injunctions against administrative
actions;
20
2. Improvements in institutions and/or their services;' 2'
118. See, e.g., Wayne Co. Jail Inmates v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs., Civ. Action #173217(Cir.
Ct. for Wayne City, Mich, 1972).
119. 42 U.S.C. §1983.
120. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp.
857 (D.R.I. 1970) the existing policies were invalidated and new ones fashioned or ordered
fashioned under court supervision. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971),affd.
510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1975) This case presents a notable exception to reluctance by Supreme Court
and most appellate courts to intervene aggressively in administrative policy making, absent flagrant
abuses. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396(1974) The
Supreme Court has invalidated certain regulations relating to mail censorship and disciplinary due
process, but the constitutional safeguards required for the future are extremely cautious ones.
121. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (orders for substantial improvements);
Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (involving a wide rangeof improvements);
Newman v. Ala., 349 F.Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (involving comprehensive improvements in
medical services); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), a/'d, 501 F.2d 1291(5th Cir.
1974). When necessary extreme measures will be taken in prisoners' rights cases. Defendants argued
that the federal district court exceeded its jurisdiction since the state lacked the financial ability
to implement the order. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument and held that the
Constitution requires an overhaul of Mississippi State Penitentiary and it must be accomplished
even if it meant spending money that the state did not then have. See also Wayne Co. Jail Inmates
v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs., Civ. Action #173217 (Cir. Ct. for Wayne City, Mich. 1972) A
Michigan State Court rejected the view that a judicial order requiring appropriation of funds
violated the separation of powers doctrine by stating:
We have only ordered such relief as is necessary to secure for the prisoners that which
they are minimally guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of State and Nation. With
respect to the appropriation of funds, we have merely said that the Commissioners will be
required to appropriate and expend such funds as may be necessary to secure such rights
of the inmates. We are satisfied that where County government has by action or inaction
inflicted legal wrongs upon inmates, as in the instant case, the Court may require the
County to correct and redress such wrongs, even though to do so will require the
expenditure of public funds.
15
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3. Closing of all1 22 or part of123 institutions; refusal to send prisoners to
institutions 2l and release or transfer;125
4. Release from solitary, 26 change from transferred status, or restoration
of good time;
27




122. Inmates of Suffolk Co. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d
1196 (1 st Cir. 1974); Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F.Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974).
123. Inmates of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F.Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
124. U.S. v. Alsbrook, 336 F.Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971).
125. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971) The court
ordered that two pretrial detainees either be transferred to more appropriate facilities or
discharged from custody.
126. Krist v. Ricketts, 504 F.2d 887 (5th/Cir. 1974) Habeas corpus, not §1983, was held to be the
proper remedy for seeking release from solitary confinement.
127. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) Federal habeas corpus is the only appropriate
remedy for the restoration of good time. Which leaves the question of whether this rationale can be
extended to cover release from solitary confinement and change from transferred status?
128. Landman v. Royster, 354 F.Supp. 1302(E.D. Va. 1973); Lareauv. Manson, 383 F.Supp. 214
(D. Conn. 1974) Punitive damages are not often awarded in § 1983 actions; they "are not a favorite of
law and are to be allowed only with caution and within narrow limits." Davidson v. Dixon, 386
F.Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974) Punitive damages can be awarded in cases of malicious action in gross
disregard of plaintiff's rights in cases where such an award would have a deterrent effect on a
defendant and others similiarly situated. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir, 1971) Damage
awards here were held to be against individuals only and therefore may not be passed on to suc-
cessors. Landman v. Royster, 354 F.Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) An estate is not liable for damages
flowing from actions of a person since deceased. A government is not liable under § 1983 for actions
of employees. But see Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. N.Y., 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Respondeat superior
does not apply in a § 1983 suit (i.e. an official is not liable for acts of subordinates without some
personal involvement in those acts on the part of party sought to be charged. The personal involve-
ment requirement may be met, not only when a superior personally directs his subordinates to do
acts, but also when he has actual knowledge of their acts and acquiesces in them.
129. Gates v. Collier, 371 F.Supp. 1368 (N.D. Miss. 1973),sustained, 489 F.2d 298(5th Cir. 1973)
Attorney's fees of $65,000 were awarded here on a bad faith exception. Awarding of attorney's fees
against a governmental unit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even though funds for
payment of costs may come from state appropriations. See also Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899
(6th Cir. 1974); Incarcerated Men of Allen Co. Jail v. Fair, 376 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ohio 1973), affd,
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) The general rule as outlined by this case is that attorney's fees are not
ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefore;
but there are three exceptions:
1) "attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons;
2) party reimbursed when litigation confers "a substantial benefit on the members of an
as certainable class and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among [the
members of the class]...";
3) attorney fees may be awarded when a party has acted as a "private attorney general"
where private litigants vindicate a strong public policy and provide widespread public benefit
through their efforts. Id. at 284-285.
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With the wide range of remedies available for prisoners under section 1983,
the problem is not finding a remedy, but enforcing it. The two principal methods
of enforcement are: 1) the use of the contempt power, and 2) the appointment
of special judicial officers.
Civil contempt ensures that the victorious party receives the full relief that
the court granted.130 Under contempt the court can impose a fine in order to
secure future compliance as well as a fine if actual losses occurred because of
failure to comply. A few courts have used the contempt power although the
fines were then suspended and defendants were given additional time to comply.
Judges appear extremely reluctant to fine defendants even when defendants are
found in contempt. Government units should be subject to fines for failure to
comply with orders for equitable relief13' although previously they have not
been held liable as they were not considered "persons" for the purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.132 However, since Monell v. Department of Social Services New
York, 133 municipalities are subject to liability under section 1983 and therefore
not wholly immune from section 1983 suits. Further, as "persons" subject to lia-
bility under section 1983, local governing bodies could be sued directly for
monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief where the action that was alleged to be
unconsitutional implemented a policy statement, ordinance, regulations, or
decision officially adopted by that body's officers, or where constitutional depri-
vations were due to governmental "custom," even though such custom had not
received formal approval through the body's decision-making channels.
A few judges 34 have appointed special judicial officers to assist in enforcing
It should be noted that attorney fees were awarded on the "private attorney general" exception
here-S2000.00 against sheriff. But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240,
(1975) Attorney's fees were not awarded against defendants here on the "private attorney general"
exception in the absence of Congressional action. Seealso Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.
1975) (A lyeska used to deny recovery); Gates v. Collier, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975) (A lyeska should
have no impact on the "bad faith" exception, but here remanded for reconsideration in light of).
130. Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (good faith is irrelevant since civil
contempt is used to correct not to punish; "if the plaintiffs have been deprived of that which the
court ordered,... then the role of the courts is not to fix blame on the defendants, but rather to pre-
vent a recurrence and to repair any damage that has been done. This duty devolves upon the court
regardless whether the defendants tried in good faith to carry out the terms of the injunction." Id. at
1300-1301; there was a $2,500 fine because defendants failed, among other things, to implement
minimum due process safeguards for disciplinary procedures); see also Hamilton v. Love, 358 F.
Supp. 696 (E.D. Ark. 1973) and Jones v. Wittenberg, 357 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
131. C.f., Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).
132. A municipality has been held not be be a "person" for purposes of § 1983 and can not be a
defendant in a § 1983 action for equitable relief. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 467 (1961).
133. On June 6, 1978, in a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Monroe v. Pape and
held that local governments, municipal corporations and school boards were "persons" subject to
§ 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of the City of N.Y. 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978).
134. Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405,
321 A.2d 603 (1974); Wayne Co. Jail inmates v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs. Civ. Action# 173217
(Cir. Ct. for Wayne City, Mich. 1972); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
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court orders. F. R.C. P. section 53 empowers a federal court to appoint a master
in cases which are "complicated" or in which there are "exceptional cir-
cumstances." F.R.C.P. section 70 allows a court to enforce compliance with an
existing court order by directing the "act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has
a like effect as if done by the party."
Using their inherent power and F. R.C.P. sections 53 and 70, federal courts in
several jurisdictions (and some state courts) have appointed masters,135
monitors, 36 and ombudsmen 37 to perform a wide range of tasks in prisoners'
rights litigation.
38
On remand, if the District Court finds the inmates' allegations in Bolding v.
Holshauser true, then the court must grant relief and they may consider relief
that is broad and reformatory in nature. Some of the remedies requested by the
North Carolina prisoners are far short of sweeping and reformatory. Basic
sanitary, hygenic, and medical facilities; inmate protection; untampered mail
unless justified; and due process in administrative hearings are well defined
rights, and where violations have occurred, relief has been granted. There
would not appear to be any undue burden on the prison system to ensure such
rights. The relief requested by North Carolina inmates regarding overcrowding
might, however, be considered reformatory and radical although such relief
has been requested before. Although prisons have been threatened with closure,
no on-the-spot shutdown has been ordered. The request for injunctions against
new prisoners entering the North Carolina prison system is probably an
unworkable solution, although the influx could be slowed by courts willing to
try novel non-jail punishment. Sentencing, generally, might be reviewed. Halt-
ing prison construction hardly seems to answer the overcrowding problem. In
some situations, mobile units might be a temporary solution. Reducing prison
population through early release or parole might have some positive effect, also.
It seems clear that action is needed in several areas and a lack of funds should
not be allowed to dictate whether Eighth Amendment rights are protected or not
protected. The District Court might consider appointing a special commission
to study the problem and make recommendations. The court might also con-
sider setting deadlines for certain events to take place and appoint a special
monitor to oversee the carrying out of any solutions.
MARJORIE SEIFERHELD
135. Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.Supp. 1016 (ED. La. 1970); Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 321
A.2d 603 (1974).
136. Wayne Co. Jail Inmates v. Wayne Co. Bd. of Comm'rs., Civ. Action # 173217 (Cir. Ct. for
Wayne City, Mich. 1972).
137. Morales v. Turman, 364 F.Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
138. Special officers have been defined as follows: Masters-primarily fact finders for the court;
Receivers-primarily hold, manage, or liquidate property; "Special" Masters-responsible for mul-
tiple functions such as fashioning a plan and assisting with implementation; Monitors-responsible
for observing the implementation process and reporting to the courts; and Ombudsmen-re-
sponsible for hearing inmate complaints and grievances, conducting investigations and making
recommendations to the courts. Comment, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree
Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
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